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The Department of Defense is embarked on efforts to transform the 
nation’s armed forces to meet the demands being placed on them by a 
changing world order.  There is a growing threat of missiles, information 
warfare and biological, chemical, and nuclear weaponry, different than the 
cold war era threat, but equally troublesome.  Similarly, there is the need 
to begin creating the military of the future - one that takes full advantage 
of revolutionary new technologies.  Further, the Department must 
modernize and transform the business of defense, getting the best value for 
the taxpayer’s money.  [Ref. 1:p. 1] 
The Department of Defense (DoD) Science and Technology (S&T) program has 
as its primary mission to develop and transition superior technology that enables 
affordable and decisive military capability.  To perform this mission well, it is imperative 
that DoD S&T programs draw upon the nation’s best researchers and technology 
developers.  Among the best S&T performers are many companies that primarily serve 
the needs of the commercial marketplace.  [Ref. 2:p. 41] 
By the early 1980’s, it was recognized that technology was progressing at an ever-
increasing pace.  It was also recognized within the Congress and the Department of 
Defense that the Department was no longer leading the S&T focus of the country.  The 
commercial marketplace was rapidly becoming the primary S&T driver.  
Industry’s share of national R&D performance has been rising steadily—
from two-thirds of the total in the 1970s to nearly three-fourths in the late 
1990s. During the same period (1970-97), the academic share rose 
slightly—from 9-10 percent to 12-13 percent—and the federal share 
dropped by half—from 16 percent to 8 percent.  [Ref. 3:p. 5] 
Particularly troubling to the Department was the fact that it was no longer the 
preferred customer for many of the companies at the forefront of these emerging 
technologies.  [Ref. 4:p. 1]  Existing legislation and procurement regulations did not 
allow the Department of Defense much flexibility with regard to the types of  
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procurement vehicles available.  There was also little flexibility with regard to the 
plethora of procurement regulations that impacted Department of Defense procurements.  
[Ref. 5:p. 11] 
Congress decided to get involved to ensure that the Department of Defense had 
access to a broader spectrum of the national technology and industrial base.  In 
November 1989, Congress enacted 10 U.S.C. 2371 (Public Law 101-189, Section 251) 
giving authority to the Secretary of Defense, through the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA), to conduct research and technology development using 
“cooperative agreements” or “other transactions”.  This authority, initially provided for 
two years, allowed for the use of instruments that more closely resemble commercial 
contracts.  It was expected that the use of these instruments would improve DoD’s 
chances to access an otherwise closed source of science and technology (S&T) support.  
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1992 (Public Law 102-190, Section 826) 
amended 10 U.S.C. 2371 to make the authority permanent, and extended it to the 
Secretaries of the Military Services.  A more detailed discussion of relevant legislation 
follows in Chapter II.  
B. PRIOR RESEARCH 
Since 1997, six theses have been generated at the Naval Postgraduate School on 
the topic of Other Transactions (OTs).  To some extent, all address the changing 
environment affecting science and technology, particularly that part of interest to DoD.  
They also discussed the legislation making OTs possible.  However, as would be 
expected, the researchers looked at different aspects of OTs.  
Tucker (2002) focused on Technology Investment Agreements (TIA) used in 
DoD’s Dual Use Science and Technology (DUS&T) Program during fiscal years 1997 
through 2001.  Her thesis describes the genesis of the term TIA. 
On 2 December 1997, after determining that having two very similar 
agreements with different names was confusing, the Director of Defense 
Research and Engineering (DDR&E), who was responsible for managing 
research OTs, issued guidance merging the two types of agreements into a 
single class of instrument called a TIA.  [Ref. 5:p. 13]   
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The two types of agreements referred to in the Tucker thesis are cooperative 
agreements and OTs for research. 
Gilliland (2001) focused on DoD’s attempt to attract non-traditional defense 
contractors by using Section 845 Other Transactions.  The period covered by this 
research was 1994 through 2000.  [Ref. 4:p. 5] 
Stamatopoulas (1999) also limited his research to Section 845 Other Transactions.  
He chose to focus his research on “appraisal metrics that measure both the use and value” 
of this particular segment of Other Transactions.  [Ref. 6:p. 4] 
Slade (1998) performed research on Other Transactions awarded to support a 
specific program called the “Commercial Operations and Support Savings Initiative 
(COSSI).”  COSSI was DoD’s attempt at inserting commercial components into DoD 
weapons systems in order to save money.  Slade’s research was limited to 1997.  [Ref. 7] 
As with Stamatopoulas (1999), Hayes (1998) addressed the need for management 
tools.  However, whereas Stamatopoulas focused on management metrics, Hayes chose to 
focus on the decision processes required to determine when an Other Transaction is the 
proper instrument.  [Ref. 8:p. 4] 
Howell’s (1997) research focused on awards made by DARPA since they were 
“the most predominant and most experienced user of this contractual vehicle . . .”  
Howell noted that: 
A limitation of this study is that research was conducted principally with 
DARPA and does not provide a significant perspective on the use of OTs 
by other DoD components.  [Ref. 9:p. 5] 
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive analysis of Department 
of Defense Other Transaction awards as reported to Congress for fiscal years 1997 
through 2003 in order to determine the extent to which these awards have achieved the 
objectives of the legislation that made them possible.  The primary focus of this research 
is to determine the extent that traditional DoD contractors have benefited from awards 
citing Other Transaction Authority.   
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This thesis differs from previous research in that the researcher accessed all 
reports submitted to Congress over a seven year period.  That is, the researcher collected 
the raw data for this seven-year period whereas previous researchers used statistical data 
presented in GAO reports, DARPA websites, and presentations by DoD officials.  
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Question 
• Have Other Transactions (OTs) met the intent of Congress? 
2. Secondary Questions 
• What is congressional intent with respect to Other Transactions? 
• What percentage of Department of Defense RDT&E dollars are awarded 
through the use of Cooperative Agreements or Other Transactions? 
• To what extent are the recipients of OTs traditional defense contractors? 
E.  SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
Other Transactions were expected to more closely resemble commercial contracts 
in that Government unique requirements imposed by the Federal Acquisition Regulations 
(FAR) and various procurement statutes do not apply.  Consequently, they should 
improve DoD’s chances to access an otherwise closed source of science and technology 
(S&T) support.  Previous research indicates that these “non-traditional” companies are 
being accessed using Other Transaction Authority, but not to the extent expected or 
intended.  [Ref. 4:p. 101 and Ref. 5:p. 21] 
The approach of this study is to evaluate Other Transaction awards by the 
Department of Defense for fiscal years 1997 through 2003, to determine the scope of 
participation of traditional and non-traditional companies. 
In order to gain a better understanding of the legislative intent, regulatory 
implementation, and the execution of Other Transaction Authority by major DoD 
activities, the researcher first reviewed relevant literature, including but not limited to:  
• References, publications, and electronic media available at the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  
• Published reports, databases, journal articles, and research papers.  
• Internet websites and homepages. 
• Major government investigative reports from the General Accounting 
Office and the Department of Defense Inspector General. 
 5 
• For fiscal years 1997 through 2001, the Department of Defense’s Annual 
Report to Congress on Cooperative Agreements and Other Transactions 
may be found on the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense 
Procurement and Acquisition Policy (OSD DPAP) website.  To obtain the 
fiscal year 2002 and 2003 reports, this researcher contacted OSD DPAP 
directly for a copy. 
F. ORGANIZATION  
The thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter I, the introduction, identifies the 
focus and purpose of the thesis, states the primary and secondary research questions and 
discusses the scope of research and the methodology.  Chapter II presents background 
information on the defense and science and technology environments since the end of the 
Cold War.  This chapter also describes the legislative history and congressional intent of 
Other Transaction Authority, and provides background on the Department of Defense’s 
use of Other Transaction Authority since November 1989. Chapter III provides details 
regarding Department of Defense Other Transaction awards as reported to Congress for 
fiscal years 1997 through 2003, and identifies the “Top 100” defense contractors for that 
same period.  This chapter also provides a comprehensive analysis of that data.  Chapter 
IV provides the study’s principal conclusions, recommendations, answers to the research 
questions and identifies areas for future study.  
G. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY  
This thesis is intended to benefit Congress, DoD policy makers and DoD 
activities contemplating the use of Other Transactions.  An analysis of the intended vs. 
actual recipients of Other Transactions will help policy makers measure the success of 
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II. BACKGROUND  
One of the things that has prevailed particularly in this battle is our 
technology.  [Schwarzkopf]   
A. INTRODUCTION 
The technology that General Norman Schwarzkopf references in his statement 
above made all the difference when it came to overwhelming the Iraqis in the first Gulf 
War, a victory achieved with minimal U.S. casualties.  That advanced technology 
included laser-guided munitions that fly through the front door of a building, stealth 
aircraft, missiles that can kill enemy missiles, airborne sensors that can detect and kill a 
single tank or anti-aircraft battery from hundreds of miles away, and night vision goggles 
that can turn night into day.  [Ref. 10:p. 219]  Many of these same systems (e.g., the 
Patriot missile system) were perfected with current state-of-the-art sensors that made 
them even more deadly in the most recent Iraqi conflict (March 2003).  
One could conclude that the United States has a significant lead over any potential 
adversary and that incremental technological improvements will ensure our lead.  What 
most people do not realize is that most of the systems that performed so impressively in 
Desert Storm are not new; rather, they are merely improved versions of technology that 
had been previously developed.  The stealth technology in the F-117 is thirty years old.  
The Patriot missile system contains mostly Viet Nam War era technology.  [Ref. 10:p. 
220]  What we have is “perfected technology.”   
A case in point is the smart bomb.  These first appeared during World War II.  At 
the time they were called “guided” bombs.  These first smart bombs were a vast 
improvement over their predecessors in their ability to “find the target.”  In the early 
1970’s, lasers were incorporated into the smart bombs to improve accuracy.  Although 
these bombs were advertised as a new weapon, they were not new.  They were merely an 
improved weapon system.  [Ref. 11:p. 1]   
“By the 1980s, there were better night vision devices, which also improved smart 
bomb effectiveness. But these were not new weapons. However, they were pitched as 
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new “weapons systems” in order to justify the high cost of the night vision gear and all 
the new electronics needed to make possible night operations by bombers dropping smart 
bombs.”  [Ref. 11:p. 1]  By the 1990’s, there were other options for guiding munitions.  
“In addition to the laser approach, you could also choose a guidance system that had a 
TV camera in the nose of the bomb, allowing the “weapons officer” on the bomber to 
literally fly the bomb to very precise targets (even through a window.)  [Ref. 11:p. 1]   
Most recently, bomb technology has benefited from a new technology called the 
Global Positioning System (GPS).  Now the GPS location could be inserted into the 
smart bombs memory, and the bomb’s GPS receiver would provide the directions that 
would guide the bomb to the target.  “At this point, the smart bomb, benefiting from five 
decades of improvements, became cheaper, more reliable, easier to use and remarkably 
effective.”  Again, this was perfected technology, not new technology.  [Ref. 11:p. 1]   
U.S. military strategy has shifted from countering the threat of a single 
superpower to preparing to confront future unknown adversaries with unknown 
capabilities.   
The speed of technological change raises unprecedented challenges.  The 
spread of modern weaponry has multiplied the number of sophisticated 
Third World arsenals that include such items as advanced tanks, attack 
submarines, and cruise missiles.  Of grave concern is the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them.  By the year 2000, it is 
estimated that at least 15 developing nations will have the ability to build 
ballistic missiles--eight of which either have, or are near to acquiring 
nuclear capabilities.  Thirty countries will have chemical weapons and 10 
will be able to deploy biological weapons as well.  These threats are 
clearly on the horizon and we must shape capabilities to respond to them.  
[Ref. 12:p. ix]   
The problem is not just the proliferation of military technologies, but also 
the widespread availability of weapons on the open market.  Other than 
nuclear weapons, there is very little that any country with money cannot 
buy.  Thus, some Third World nations, especially those with oil reserves, 
have been able to acquire substantial arsenals.  Several nations have 
bought sophisticated types of weapons that, even if not possessed in large 
numbers, can severely complicate U.S. defense plans.  Anti-ship cruise 
missiles are an example.  [Ref. 13:p. 6] 
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One need look no further than the uproar during Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003) 
over Iraq’s ability to obtain night vision devices with assistance from Syria, or Iraq’s 
ability to obtain antitank missiles, jamming gear, and support services for those systems 
from Russian companies for evidence of these trends.  [Ref. 14:p. 1 and Ref. 15:p. 1]  As 
General Horner noted,    
The Russians sell on the open market the GPS jammer. It’s about the size 
of a package of cigarettes, and it goes out for a limited area, maybe 20 
miles, and you just have to build a bigger one if you’re going to go out 
further.  [Ref. 16:p. 8] 
Throughout the Cold War, United States doctrine focused on countering the 
Soviet Union’s greater numbers of weapon systems with fewer, higher performance 
weapons.  Weapons performance was primarily benchmarked against the capabilities of 
the Soviet Union.  However, despite the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. policy of 
performance over numbers continues.  We have been slow to adjust, but the international 
arms market must now be the benchmark by which the United States measures weapons 
performance.  [Ref. 13:p. 13] 
The future choices about the performance of U.S. weapons relative to that of 
potential enemies will have significant long-term effects on the defense 
technology and production base supporting U.S. military forces. These choices 
will determine how much effort is devoted to research for new technology, what 
the sources of that technology will be, and how it will be paid for.                
[Ref. 13:p. 13] 
The Department of Defense and Congress understand that technology is a force 
multiplier.  It is clear that the uncertainty of future defense budgets requires both 
continual incremental advances in technology as well as leap-ahead advances if the U.S. 
is to remain a dominant force in the world.   
DoD seeks to transform the armed forces, taking advantage of new 
technologies and operational concepts to strengthen America’s military 
capabilities. The deployment of robotic, unmanned combat air vehicles 
(UCAVs) could, one day, replace certain strike aircraft and provide a 
means to easily overwhelm less sophisticated, opposing air forces. 
Similarly, the employment of advanced laser communications satellites, 
coupled with new information warfare techniques, could render most 
existing command and control systems obsolete and vulnerable. 
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Transforming DoD should produce new forces capable of projecting 
power rapidly, precisely, and on a global basis. These forces will be well-
tailored to meet the needs of the 21st Century security environment.  [Ref. 
17:p. 1] 
B. DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
In 2005, it is difficult to imagine a defense procurement environment not 
dominated by Lockheed Martin Corporation, The Boeing Company, Northrop Grumman 
Corporation, Raytheon Corporation, and General Dynamics Corporation.  These 
companies have dominated the Department of Defense acquisition landscape in recent 
years.  [Ref. 18:p. 1 and Ref. 19:p. 1]  However, that has not always been the case. 
Until the beginning of World War II, the United States had no armaments 
industry.  When the need would arise, this commercial-focused U.S. industry could 
convert from production of commercial goods and services to production of military 
goods and services to support the war effort.  [Ref. 20: p. 100]  These firms viewed this 
effort as temporary and as such, never really lost their “commercial business” 
characteristics.  At the end of World War II these industries went back to commercial 
production just as they had before the war. 
However, by the mid-1950’s the defense environment was changing.  Primarily as 
a response to the Cold War (1945-1990), the United States was transitioning from a 
policy of mobilization in time of peril to one of “forces-in-being.”  That policy change 
not only required a large military establishment, but a new industrial entity to support it.  
President Eisenhower first used the term “military-industrial complex” in his farewell 
radio and television address to the American people on January 17, 1961.  [Ref. 20:p. 
100]  
In contrast to the World War II experience, the Cold War experience was one 
where the defense and commercial markets existed simultaneously.  As time passed, 
firms involved in defense-related industries gradually evolved away from commercial 
practices based in large part on the procurement practices of the Department of Defense.  
[Ref. 21:p. 242] 
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Since the end of World War II there have been two major downturns in the 
defense industry.  The period from 1968 to 1974 was the first.  The second (1985 – 1997) 
is discussed below (see “Defense Budgets”).  In response to this second downturn, the 
defense industry underwent a major restructuring.  There were 21 companies doing major 
defense aerospace work in 1993.  As shown above, that number has dwindled to five.  
The increased competition for shrinking defense budgets during the 1985 – 1987 
timeframe resulted in a significant number of mergers, acquisitions, and the formation of 
partnerships among defense contractors.  [Ref. 22:p. 144] 
As the number of firms decline, the amount of research funded by any one firm 
will be strongly influenced by the amount of research funded by other firms in their 
relative market.  “Additionally, the resources expended on internal R&D will depend on 
the expected distribution of work and profits among the firms involved after the prime 
contractor is selected.”  [Ref. 22:p. 144] 
C. DEFENSE BUDGETS 
Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen noted in the Quadrennial Defense Review 
Report of May 1997, 
During most of the Cold War years, the United States pursued a strategy 
of containing the Soviet Union.  In 1985, America appropriated about 
$400 billion for the Department of Defense (in constant, fiscal year 1997 
dollars), which constituted 28 percent of our national budget and 7 percent 
of our Gross National Product.  We had more than 2.2 million men and 
women under arms, with about 500,000 overseas, 1.1 million in the 
Reserve forces, and 1.1 million civilians in the employment of the 
Department of Defense.  Defense companies employed 3.7 million more 




Figure 1.   Department of Defense Budget Authority by Title, 1985 - 2007  (From: 
[Ref. 24:p. 14]) 
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, from the peak of the Reagan build-up in 1985 through 
1997, the United States made significant changes to Department of Defense funding and 
manpower in response to the equally significant changes taking places around the world.  
During that period, the defense budget was reduced by 38 percent.  Force structure was 
reduced by 33 percent.  Procurement programs were reduced by 63 percent.  At the time 
the Quadrennial Defense Review Report was release by Secretary Cohen, the budget of 
the Department of Defense was $250 billion, there were 1.45 million men and women in 
the armed forces (including civilians), and procurement accounts were $44 billion.  
During that same 1985 – 1997 period, the defense industrial base reduced the number of 
workers to 2.2 million, a 41 percent reduction from 1985 levels.  [Ref. 23:p. 1] 
There was a steady decline in funding of Department of Defense programs during 
much of the Clinton Administration.  Under the Clinton Administration, “the Pentagon 
was largely forced to take a procurement holiday -- deferring or canceling outright long-
overdue acquisitions of ships, planes, armored vehicles and other modernization 
programs.”  [Ref. 25:p. 1]  Toward the end of Clinton’s second term, readiness was at an 
all time low.  Major systems were exceeding their service life, systems were being 
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cannibalized to obtain spare parts, and training budgets were under-funded.  For the first 
seven years of the Clinton administration, forces were deployed forty-eight times on 
peacekeeping and combat missions. Between 1945 and 1990, the military was deployed 
overseas 50 times.  [Ref. 26:p. 2]   
Personnel cuts during that same period meant longer deployments.  
The Army and the Air Force fell short of their 1999 recruiting goals by 
6,300 and 1,700 recruits, respectively.  The Navy met its 1999 goals, but 
only after changing its standards to make up for the nearly 7,000 sailors it 
fell short of in 1998.  It has become difficult for the military to keep the 
people it has. In 1999, for example, the Air Force missed its retention 
goals in all enlisted categories, losing 5,000 enlistees.  Even the Marines, 
who usually attract prospective recruits with ease, were beginning to have 
retention problems. Throughout the first part of 2000, they lost people at a 
rate 10 percent higher than expected.  [Ref. 26:p. 2]   
The Clinton Administration could no longer ignore these issues.  Under intense 
pressure from concerned congressional leadership, the Administration included a request 
for additional defense funding for fiscal year 1999.  In response to the Administration’s 
request, Congress added approximately $8 billion to the defense budget which 
represented the first real increase in inflation-adjusted dollars since 1985.  Administration 
officials indicated that the President intended to seek an estimated $110 billion in 
additional spending over the next six years.  [Ref. 27:p. 1] 
President George W. Bush took office on January 20, 2001.  His top two priorities 
for DoD was improve military readiness and a strong missile defense strategy.  The 
FY2002 budget was the first comprehensive budget of his administration.  The FY2002 
budget included a request for the Department of Defense for a total of $329 billion.  The 
$329 billion total represented an increase of $33 billion over defense funding for 2001.  
In a press release of June 22, 2001, a senior defense official justified the increased DoD 
budget.   
The administration has inherited severe shortfalls in readiness, in health 
care, in operations, maintenance and infrastructure, far worse than was 
originally understood.  This amendment takes steps to begin to deal with 
these funding deficiencies and to establish fiscal certainty and discipline.  
[Ref. 28:p. 1] 
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Less than nine months after President Bush took office, New York and 
Washington, D.C. were attacked by terrorists.  As illustrated in Figure 1, budgets for 
Operations & Maintenance, Military personnel, and Procurement increased sharply 
reflecting the Bush Administration and Congress’ support of the war on terror, which 
included military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
In contrast to the changes experienced in the overall defense budget from 1985 
through 2000, the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) budget 
remained relatively flat.  The RDT&E budget is made up of seven budget activities1.  
They are: 
• Basic Research 
• Applied Research 
• Advanced Technology Development 
• Advanced Component Development and Prototypes 
• Systems Development and Demonstration 
• RDT&E Management Support 
• Operational System Development 
These budget activities are frequently referred to as budget categories 6.1 – 6.7, 
respectively.  Budget categories 6.1 – 6.3 constitute the Science and Technology (S&T) 
portion of the budget.  The President’s budget for FY2002 provides a good summary of 
the rationale for the increases from 2000 to the present:   
The budget proposes a $2.6 billion initiative ($20 billion over five years) 
to fund R&D of new technologies.  Among areas in which new investment 
might be made include: leap-ahead technologies for new weapons and 
intelligence systems; improvements to the laboratory and test range 
infrastructure; technologies aimed at reducing the costs of weapons and 
intelligence systems; efforts, such as counter-terrorism and counter-
proliferation that are focused on countering unconventional threats to 
national security; and funding to continue research, development, and 





1  Appendix A provides a more detailed description of these budget categories. [Ref. 30:p. 1] 
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D. RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT 
A strong federal role in support of science and technology is a relatively recent 
phenomenon in the United States.  The 1950’s saw a sea change in the sources of funding 
for research in the United States.  Prior to that period, the source of scientific discovery 
was the university.  Small budgets and intellectual curiosity were the key drivers.  By the 
time Eisenhower left office in 1961, the country’s research focus had become centralized, 
formalized, complex, and expensive.  In this new environment, the federal government 
was the driving force behind the nation’s research.   
Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes 
virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity.  For every old blackboard 
there are now hundreds of new electronic computers.  [Ref. 31:p. 3] 
Defense was the predominant focus of that science and technology (S&T) 
funding.  In fact, the share of S&T funding aimed at defense needs remains considerably 
higher in the United States than in other developed countries, although the U.S. defense-
related share has been declining as previously noted.  The primary focus of that defense-
related S&T funding goes to support research in computer science, materials science, and 
engineering.  [Ref. 32:p. 21] 
In the 1950’s and 1960’s, many high-technology advances came from defense 
funded laboratories.  Substantial amounts of S&T funding were spent on R&D, not 
directly focused on a particular market, but in areas of general interest to the U.S. public 
(e.g., space, health, and energy).  “Federal R&D investments were on a stable growth 
path during that period and, at their high point, constituted about two-thirds of total 
national R&D funding.”  [Ref. 32:p. 62] 
Investments in research not aimed at specific agency missions have 
traditionally been relatively small.  During the 1980’s that began to 
change, as such programs as the multi-agency Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) program, the Advanced Technology Program of the 
Department of Commerce, the SEMATECH consortium of U.S.-based 
semiconductor companies and the Department of Defense, and the 
Engineering Research Centers program of the National Science 
Foundation were launched.  [Ref. 32:p. 27] 
Discussions related to Federal support of the nation’s science and technology 
usually focus on the government’s direct funding of R&D.  “Yet the federal government 
made several other important policy changes during the 1980’s that were as important as 
the launch of new programs involving direct support of science and technology.”  These 
legislative changes encouraged the flow of science and technology from government 
laboratories and universities to industry, encouraged cooperative research arrangements 
between industry partners, and implemented a temporary tax credit for industrial R&D.  
[Ref. 32:p. 28]  The researcher will expand on these very important changes in “The 
Federal Response” (below). 
By the 1980’s, U.S.-based companies were setting the pace in fast-growing 
information technology and biotechnology fields.  The United States became a leader in 
commercializing research through the creation of new technology-based firms.  
Commercial R&D investment was on the rise.   
 
 
Figure 2.   Shares of National R&D Expenditures, By Source of Funds:  1953-2000  




Figure 3.   Trends in Federal and Non-Federal R&D Expenditures as a Percentage of 
Total R&D:  1953-2000 (From: [Ref. 33]) 
 
Innovation in two broad, science-based industrial sectors has contributed 
to U.S. innovative success in the 1990s. The first is information 
technology, including semiconductors, computers, software, 
communications equipment, and information technology services. The 
second is the complex of industries that feed new technology into health 
care, including biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and medical devices. 
Among the 50 U.S. firms with the largest research and development 
(R&D) budgets in 1994, the 20 with the highest ratio of R&D spending to 
sales were all in either the information or health care sectors.  [Ref. 32:p. 
17] 
Whereas research budgets for corporations in the information technology and 
biotechnology sectors were on the rise, there was a distinct down-turn of research budgets 
in other sectors.  As previously stated, until the 1950’s, the primary source of scientific 
discovery was the university.  There was also a secondary source of research and 
development that emerged after World War II.  That was the corporate research 
laboratory.  “The corporate laboratories of companies such as Du Pont, AT&T, IBM, and 
Xerox grew to become important sources of fundamental technologies.”  [Ref. 32:p. 18] 
These corporate laboratories were predominately successful when the environment 
included product lifecycles that could be measured in years and there was a high 
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probability of recouping research investments.  However, the 1980’s saw a significant 
change in that environment.  Deregulation and increased global competition led 
companies to shift their focus from longer-term or speculative research to short-term 
results.  [Ref. 32:p. 18]     
A recent analysis of U.S. patents issued to inventors from all over 
the world shows a dramatic increase in the reliance of inventions on recent 
science.  The trend is especially pronounced for U.S. inventions in the 
medical and chemical fields.  A large percentage of the scientific citations 
in recent patents resulted from work in universities and government 
laboratories.  [Ref. 32:p. 18]   
This data supports the assertion that companies are investing less in basic and 
applied research in favor of leveraging government-funded research in those areas.  Some 
firms directly fund universities performing basic and applied research in areas of interest 
to the firm. 
As product life cycles began to be measured in months rather than years, industry 
executives and investors became fanatical about quarterly profit-and-loss statements.  
This has forced many private sector firms to eliminate their long-term R&D focus and 
infrastructure in favor of research focused on short-term results.  “As federal R&D 
funding has flattened, a major reversal in funding sources has occurred, with industry 
now providing two-thirds of the nation’s R&D funding, albeit with this shorter-term, 
product-oriented focus.”  [Ref. 32:p. 62] 
E. THE FEDERAL RESPONSE 
1. Introduction 
As we have seen, the U.S. defense landscape of the late 1980’s was characterized 
by a change from a single superpower adversary to multiple adversaries with the potential 
to obtain the latest technologically advanced weapons, significant budget reductions, a 
reduction in the number of defense industry participants, and a high-technology 
environment dominated by the commercial marketplace.  These facts were not lost on the 
Department of Defense or Congress. 
The dramatic change in focus from a single superpower adversary as the known 
threat to multiple unknown adversaries forced the Department of Defense to consider 
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significant changes to its perspective on weapons system procurement.  Throughout the 
Cold War, United States doctrine focused on countering the Soviet Union’s greater 
numbers of weapon systems with fewer, higher performance weapons.  Weapons 
performance was primarily benchmarked against the capabilities of the Soviet Union and 
its Warsaw Pact allies.  Cost vs. performance tradeoffs were not a concern as funding for 
weapon systems in this era was considered a national priority in order to keep communist 
expansionism in check.  In contrast, the severe funding shortfalls experienced by the 
Department of Defense in the late 80’s required a greater focus on cost vs. performance 
tradeoffs in order to make hard choices about what technologies to pursue and what 
weapon systems to field.  In addition to expanding the functionality and firepower of 
large weapon platforms, more consideration was given to smaller technically advanced 
weapon systems.  [Ref. 9:p. 9] 
2. Major Legislation Affecting United States Research and Development 
In response to the challenges described above, Congress explored ways to 
stimulate technological advancement in the private sector.  There are two major policy 
approaches.  One is through the direct funding of research.  The upside to this approach is 
that the government can direct research funding to support specific agency missions or to 
long-term, high risk areas that the private sector is not likely to support.  The downside 
with this approach is that it places the government in the position of deciding what 
research is worthy of funding.  It presumes that government decision makers will make 
the “best” choices.  Although there may be some Nobel Prize winners involved in making 
decisions regarding government funding of research, a large majority of our greatest 
scientific minds do not work for the government; nor are they part of the funding decision 
process.  
The other major federal approach to stimulating research takes a more indirect 
approach.  Measures such as intellectual property rights, antitrust laws, and tax policies 
help to promote technology development in the private sector.  This is the more favored 
approach, especially during austere budget times. 
One area that Congress considered very promising was the stimulation of 
cooperative research and development (CRADA) agreements.  In the past twenty-five 
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years the government has supported various efforts to promote CRADAs among industry, 
academia, and federal agencies.  It was recognized that these cooperative efforts could 
increase the competitiveness of U.S. industry.  They would also encourage the generation 
of new or vastly improved products and services.  These collaborative ventures were 
intended to compliment the strengths of all sectors involved in the science and 
technology development arena.  Academia, industry, and government often have 
complementary resources (funding, expertise, facilities, etc.).  However, because of the 
stove-piped nature of their focus, tended to duplicate effort or work at cross purposes.  
This was certainly not in the best interest of the nation as a whole.  CRADA proponents 
saw the potential benefits of sharing costs, risks, facilities, and expertise.  They argue that 
these arrangements permit long-term and high risk research to be done that is too 
expensive for one entity to support.  From a public interest standpoint, cooperative 
research efforts encourage more effective resource utilization and attempts to minimize 
duplicative effort.  [Ref. 34:p. 1] 
There have been numerous pieces of legislation designed to promote these 
collaborative arrangements.  The more significant legislation is discussed below. 
a. Industry-Industry 
As discussed above, the federal government tends to focus on research 
related to agency mission needs and research areas that are minimally funded by the 
private sector, if at all.  One research area predominately funded by the federal 
government is basic research, primarily because it takes a substantial amount of time and 
money before there is any relevant (in private sector terms) payoff.  It is too risky for 
private sector investment. 
The major emphasis of legislative activity has been on augmenting 
research in the industrial community. This focus is reflected in efforts to 
encourage companies to undertake cooperative research arrangements and 
expand the opportunities available for increases in research activities. 
Collaboration permits work to be done which is too expensive for one 
company to fund and also allows for R&D that crosses traditional 
boundaries of expertise and experience. A joint venture makes use of 
existing, and supports development of new resources, facilities, 
knowledge, and skills.  [Ref. 34:p. 4] 
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The National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-462) was 
specifically designed to encourage firms to pool resources to carry out joint R&D 
projects.  The Act provides that joint research and development agreements and 
agreements to convey rights to use patented inventions, copyrights, or intellectual 
property shall not be deemed illegal under antitrust laws.  These agreements are to be 
judged on their reasonableness considering all pertinent factors, including their effect on 
competition in relevant markets.  The Act also made changes in the way attorney fee 
awards are made in order to discourage frivolous litigation against joint research 
ventures. 
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-418) 
covered a broad range of issues related to foreign trade and competition.  Of relevance to 
this thesis is the section of the legislation emphasizing the need for public and private 
cooperation to ensure full use of research results.  This was done through the legislation 
by establishing centers for transferring manufacturing technology, establishing industrial 
extension services within states and an information clearinghouse on successful state and 
local technology programs, extending royalty payment requirements to non-government 
employees of federal laboratories, and authorizing training technology transfer centers 
administered by the Department of Education. 
This legislation also changed the name of the National Bureau of 
Standards to the National Institute of Standards and Technology and broadened its 
technology transfer role by creating the Advanced Technology Program (ATP).  Through 
cooperative cost sharing arrangements with industry, the ATP invests directly in the 
development of high-risk, enabling technologies.  These technologies are expected to 
form the foundation for new and improved products, services, and manufacturing 
processes.  The long-term goals of the ATP are to help companies accelerate the creation 
and commercialization of innovative technologies with strong potential for generating 
broad-based economic benefits for the nation. 
The National Cooperative Production Amendments Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-
42) amends the National Cooperative Research Act by extending the original law’s 
provisions to joint ventures entered into for the purpose of producing a product, process, 
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or service and the testing in connection with such production.  The Act also excluded 
joint ventures involving production facilities located outside the United States or its 
territories and joint ventures involving non-U.S. citizens unless those non-U.S. citizens 
are from a country or countries “whose law accords antitrust treatment no less favorable 
to U.S. persons than to such country’s domestic persons with respect to participation in 
joint ventures for production.”  [Ref. 35:p. 3] 
b. Industry-Academia 
Congress also recognized that encouraging collaboration between industry 
and universities was another very important piece of the pie to stimulate technological 
advancement in the private sector.  Historically, academic institutions performed a 
predominant portion of U.S. basic research.  Universities have been able to carry out 
basic research because it is part of the educational process, and because risks are reduced 
since they do not have a profit motive as is the case for industry.  
That is not to say that universities are effective as a stand alone sector.  
Academic institutions do not have the capability to convert the results of research into 
products and services that can be marketed.  Congress understood that if research 
performed at academic institutions was to transition into commercially available products 
and services, a means to encourage interaction between industry and academia must be 
implemented.  It should be noted that even without intervention by Congress, there is and 
continues to be an informal interaction between academia and industry.  That informal 
interaction involves the educational component at universities, which serves to educate 
and train the scientists, engineers, and managers employed by companies.  [Ref. 34:p. 4] 
One might expect that increased collaboration between academia and 
industry would magnify the contributions of both parties to the advancement of U.S. 
technologies.  Industry support for research within the academic community provides 
much needed funding.  More importantly, industry is able to provide much needed 
feedback to the academic community on areas of interest.   
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Congressional attempts to stimulate industry and university collaboration 
came in the form of legislation, which provided incentives for industry to invest in 
university research.  The legislation predominately focused on tax incentives and a more 
liberal treatment of intellectual property. 
Amendments to the patent and trademark laws contained in the Bayh-Dole 
Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-517) were designed to promote collaboration between academia and 
industry.  A significant element of this Act was that it permitted universities, non-profits, 
and small businesses to own title to inventions from research funded by the federal 
government so they may license these inventions to industry for commercialization.  The 
Act reserved certain rights for the government.  Since the impetus of the Act was to 
encourage commercialization of federally funded research, the recipient’s ability to 
maintain title to those inventions required that they be commercialized within a 
predetermined time frame.  Congress believed that providing universities with title to 
patents resulting from the university’s research would encourage licensing to industry 
where the technology could be commercialized.  Congress also believed that universities 
would be motivated to participate due to the potential income resulting from licensing the 
patents to industry. 
The key elements of Title II of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 
(P.L. 97-34) that are relevant to this thesis include a temporary 25 percent tax credit for 
company support of university basic research.  Industry was also permitted a larger tax 
deduction for charitable contributions of research equipment to academic institutions.  
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-514) reduced the credit for industry investment in 
university basic research to 20 percent.  Although P.L. 99-514 reduced the credit for 
industry contributions to university basic research established by the 1981 Act, it 
increased the charitable deduction for donations of new equipment to academic 
institutions.  A stipulation was added that this equipment must be used for “research or 




Cooperation between industry and the federal government is the third and 
probably most obvious element that Congress considered in order to stimulate 
technological advancement in the private sector.   
 
 
Figure 4.   Trends in Federal R&D, FY 1976 – 2004 (From: [Ref. 36]) 
 
Government-wide investment in research and development to meet the 
mission requirements of federal departments and agencies is significant.  In January 
2004, Congress approved an omnibus appropriations bill.  This bill, when added to the 
Department of Defense and Homeland Security appropriation bills, resulted in a record-
setting $127 billion in federal research and development funding.  This amount reflects 
Congress’ commitment to federal research and development, since the appropriation was 
$4.6 billion more than was requested by the Bush Administration.  That is not to say that 
the Bush Administration is not a supporter of federal research and development.  Figure 4 
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above shows a sharp increase in federal research and development spending since fiscal 
year 2000.  For the fifteen years prior to the Bush Administration, federal research and 
development funding hovered in the $80 - $90 billion range.  [Ref. 37:p. 2] 
 
 
Figure 5.   Trends in Defense R&D, FY 1976 – 2005 (From: [Ref. 38]) 
 
As shown above, congressional funding of Department of Defense 
RDT&E accounts is also significant.   
The Bush Administration requested $61.8 billion in RDT&E funding for 
DoD for FY2004.  The actual amount appropriated in September 2003 was $66.3 billion.  
That represents a $7.6 billion (13 percent) jump over the Department of Defense RDT&E 
appropriation for fiscal year 2003.  Department of Defense RDT&E appropriations saw a 
rise in funding starting with the Reagan Administration in 1980.  It peaked during his 
second term, and slowly declined through the end of his presidency and through the first 
Bush Administration.  Over the next eight years, Department of Defense RDT&E funding 
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remained relatively low.  [Ref. 37:p. 3]  During the Clinton Administration, Congress 
appropriated between $34 billion and $41 billion per year for DoD RDT&E.  [Ref. 39:p. 
1]    
This major level of investment over the past two decades has led to 
countless new and improved technologies and processes.  It also led to the generation of 
an enormous amount of knowledge.  For many years, a significant portion of these 
resources have remained within the four walls of federal and academic laboratories.  It is 
conceivable that many of these resources may have applications beyond their original 
intent.  In order to provide access to these resources and promote commercialization in 
the industrial community, Congress enacted various laws to establish federal entities and 
mechanisms to facilitate the transition of these resources between the public and private 
sectors.   
The most significant legislation providing private sector access to federal 
laboratories is the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-480), 
as amended by the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-502), the Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act (discussed above), the 1990 Department of Defense 
(DOD) Authorization Act (P.L. 101-189), and the National Defense Authorization Act 
for FY1991 (P.L. 101-510).  [Ref. 31:p. 8] 
Prior to P.L. 96-480, technology transfer was not part of the mission 
requirements of the federal departments and agencies, with the exception of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).  The Stevenson-Wydler Technology 
Innovation Act of 1980 changed all that.  Within this Act, Congress was very explicit 
about the expanded federal role they envisioned: 
It is the continuing responsibility of the federal government to ensure the 
full use of the results of the Nation’s federal investment in research and 
development.  To this end the federal government shall strive where 
appropriate to transfer federally owned or originated [non-classified] 
technology to state and local governments and to the private sector.  
(U.S.C. Title 15, Chapter 63, Section 3710(a)(1)) 
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To ensure that the proper amount of attention was directed to this 
endeavor, P.L. 96-480 required each federal agency and their laboratories to establish an 
Office of Research and Technology Applications.  The function of the Office of Research 
and Technology Applications is to identify technologies and ideas that have potential for 
application outside of the federal government. 
As indicated above, there were several amendments to the Stevenson-
Wydler Technology Innovation Act to provide additional incentives for the transfer and 
commercialization of technology originating in federal research laboratories.  The 
Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-502) amended Stevenson-Wydler to 
allow government-owned, government-operated laboratories (GOGOs) to enter into 
CRADAs with universities and the private sector.  The FY1990 Defense Authorization 
Act (P.L. 101-189) gave authority to enter into CRADAs with universities and the private 
sector to government-owned, contractor-operated laboratories (GOCOs).  [Ref. 34:p. 6] 
CRADAs are agreements between one or more federal laboratories and 
one or more non-federal parties to perform cooperative and mutually beneficial research 
and development.  A CRADA (as defined in the statute) is not a procurement contract, 
grant or cooperative agreement.  The Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and the 
various agency procurement regulations are not applicable to CRADAs.  Under a 
CRADA, the federal laboratory can provide personnel, services, facilities, equipment, or 
other resources with or without reimbursement.  However, the laboratory cannot provide 
funds to non-federal parties under a CRADA.  Non-federal parties may provide funds, 
personnel, services, facilities, equipment, or other resources toward the conduct of 
specified research or development efforts.  
Research and development conducted under a CRADA must be consistent 
with the missions of the federal laboratory entering into the agreement.  As a matter of 
principle, CRADA objectives should be mutually beneficial to, and protect the interest of 
both parties to the agreement.   
In addition to the collaboration aspect of a CRADA, substantial 
intellectual property benefits flow to a non-federal partner.  The Act provides that the 
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director of the laboratory may enter into an advanced agreement with the participating 
non-federal partner transferring title to, or licenses for, inventions made by the 
laboratory.  The Act also provides that the director of the laboratory may enter into an 
advanced agreement with the participating non-federal partner waiving any right of 
ownership the government might have in inventions resulting from the collaborative 
effort.  However, the government retains a nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, 
paid-up license to practice (or have practiced) the invention for fulfillment of government 
requirements.  [Ref. 34:p. 6] 
The Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 provided significant 
incentives for employees of federal laboratories to facilitate the transfer of federal science 
and technology to the private sector.  Employees actively involved in that effort could 
receive cash awards if those efforts contribute to the mission of the laboratory or their 
efforts lead to commercialization of the transferred technology.  In addition, the Act 
provided that federal laboratory employees could receive at least 15 percent of royalties 
generated by the licensing of the patent(s) associated with their inventions.  The Act even 
went so far as to allow (current or former) federal employees responsible for the 
invention to obtain title (subject to the above-mentioned licensing rights of the 
government) should the government not choose to exercise its right to patent the 
invention.  [Ref. 34:p. 7] 
Laboratory personnel and former employees were also permitted to 
participate in commercialization activities provided that these activities did not conflict 
with agency ethics, conflict of interest, or code of conduct regulations.  In the case of 
GOCOs, the National Competitiveness Technology Transfer Act of 1989 (P.L. 101-189) 
required the establishment of agency safeguards to avoid conflicts of interest, and 
possible unjust enrichment of employees working at those federal laboratories. 
Preference for cooperative ventures is given to small businesses, 
companies that will manufacture in the United States, or foreign firms from countries that 
permit American companies to enter into similar arrangements.  To assist small 
businesses that may not have sophisticated management systems, the National Defense 
Authorization Act for FY1991 (P.L. 101-510) amended Stevenson-Wydler to allow 
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federal laboratories to enter into a contract or memorandum of understanding with a 
partnership intermediary to perform services related to cooperative or joint activities with 
small businesses.  The primary purpose of a partnership intermediary was to increase the 
likelihood of success in the conduct of cooperative or joint activities between a federal 
laboratory and its small business and academic institution partners. 
The legislation detailed above proved to have mixed success with regard 
to national goals of stimulating technological advancement in the private sector.  Further, 
the legislation had little impact on the ability of the Department of Defense to gain access 
to new technologies invented and fostered in the private sector.  It became apparent to the 
Department of Defense and Congress that other legislative and regulatory changes would 
be necessary.   
F. OTHER TRANSACTION AUTHORITY 
This section on Other Transaction Authority (OTA) provides background 
information relative to the government’s motivation in developing an innovative 
approach for tapping into private sector R&D, and gaining access to industry leaders who 
traditionally did not do business with the Department of Defense.  The goal of this new 
approach was to gain access to technologies that could result in weapon systems that 
were technologically superior to potential enemy forces, and do it at significantly less 
cost. 
The Department of Defense science and technology program has as its 
primary mission to develop and transition superior technology that enables 
affordable and decisive military capability.  To perform this mission well, 
it is imperative that the S&T program draw upon the nation’s best 
researchers and technology developers. 
Among the best science and technology (S&T) performers are many 
companies that primarily serve the needs of the commercial marketplace.  
In recent years, DoD’s access to those performers has been limited by 
government business practices.  These practices include many 
government-unique requirements that discouraged some companies from 
doing business with the government and caused other firms to create 
divisions for government business that are separate and isolated from 
divisions for commercial business.   
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It is in the interest of the Department of Defense to integrate the 
government and commercial sectors of the national technology and 
industrial base.  Specifically, technology and industrial base integration 
will help reduce the Department of Defense’s life-cycle costs for weapon 
and support systems.  However, for this to take place, it is imperative that 
the Department of Defense gain access to those firms that have not 
traditionally done business with the government.  It will also help increase 
technological sophistication by allowing the Department of Defense to 
take advantage of technology in the commercial marketplace that often is 
more advanced than what is available in the defense sector.  [Ref. 40:p. 3] 
The Department of Defense has various instruments at its disposal for obtaining 
the products or services it needs to meet mission requirements, or to support research of 
interest to the department.  They are contracts, grants, cooperative agreements, and Other 
Transactions.  These instruments are also used by DoD to support or acquire research.  
Each of these instruments was developed for specific purposes.  Selection of the proper 
instrument is generally based on the nature of the research, and the level and type of 
government/contractor interaction anticipated.   
The various forms of contracts used by DoD are procurement instruments.  That 
means they are used when the principle purpose of the effort is the acquisition of goods 
or services for the direct use or benefit of the department.  Grants, cooperative 
agreements, and Other Transactions (for research) are classified as assistance 
instruments.  They are used when the principal purpose is to stimulate or support research 
efforts for a public purpose (i.e., not for the direct use or benefit of the Department).  
Another key distinction between a procurement instrument and an assistance instrument 
is that procurement instruments are governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) and Department of Defense Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS).  
Assistance instruments generally are not subject to the FAR or DFARS.  Freedom from 
these government-unique requirements helped to foster relationships between DoD and 
the commercially-focused businesses that DoD hoped to attract to defense-related work.  
[Ref. 4:p. 17]     
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Of the instruments identified above, the one that tends to generate the most 
puzzled looks among acquisition professionals is the term “Other Transaction” (OT).  
Other Transactions are agreements used for research and prototype projects.  They are 
defined, not by what they are, but by what they are not.  They are not a contract, grant, or 
cooperative agreement.  Many in the Department of Defense and industry support Other 
Transactions as a way to access cutting-edge technologies and as a way to foster 
relationships with commercial firms that generally refuse to contract with the federal 
government because of unique requirements imposed by the FAR and various pro-
curement statutes.  Other Transactions are not subject to the FAR, nor are they subject to 
certain procurement statutes such as the Competition in Contracting Act or the Contract 
Disputes Act.  
The first government organization to recognize the need for an alternative 
contracting vehicle to enable DoD to tap into this commercial business sector was the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).  DARPA is the central research 
and development organization for the Department of Defense.  It manages and directs 
selected basic and applied research and development projects for DoD.  Although all the 
services have basic and applied R&D programs, DARPA is different in that it is tasked 
with pursuing high risk – high payoff technologies that can provide DoD with leap-ahead 
capabilities.  “As the private industry technology industries began to explode in the late 
1980’s, DARPA recognized that they had a need for tapping into this explosion and 
consequently, sought a contractual approach to negotiating terms and conditions that was 
more flexible than the standard FAR contract or cooperative agreement.”  [Ref. 4:p. 18] 
At DARPA’s urging, Congress decided to get involved to ensure that the 
Department of Defense had access to a broader spectrum of the national technology and 
industrial base.  In November 1989, Congress enacted Section 251 of Public Law 101-
189 (codified at 10 U.S.C. 2371) which gave authority to DARPA to conduct research 
and technology development using “cooperative agreements” or “other transactions.”  
The authority was available only if a standard contract or grant was not feasible or 
appropriate.  At the time, 10 U.S.C. 2371 was enacted as a temporary two-year pilot 
program and its applicable authorities were given only to DARPA.  It was interesting to 
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note that Congress did not define the term “Other Transactions.”  DARPA interpreted this 
lack of specificity as giving it the flexibility it desired to construct a research agreement 
that was not governed by the FAR or various procurement statutes.   
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1992 extended 10 U.S.C. 2371 
authority to the secretaries of the military departments and made it permanent.  However, 
the Act also added restrictions on the use of OTA.  One significant constraint came in the 
form of a cost-sharing requirement.  The Act required cost matching by the non-federal 
parties to the extent the Secretary of Defense determined practicable.  A primary example 
of the implementation of this requirement was the Dual Use Science & Technology 
(DUS&T) Program.  This program specifically prohibited the government from investing 
more that 50 percent of the project cost (i.e., non-government participants were required 
to invest a minimum of 50 percent of the project cost).  A second significant constraint 
was that, prior to using an Other Transaction, the awarding organization had to document 
that use of a standard contract, grant, or cooperative agreement was not feasible or 
appropriate.  
OTA was broadened even further under the National Defense Authorization Act 
for FY 1994 (Public Law 103-160).  Under the Act, DARPA was again recognized as the 
reinvention lab for this type of acquisition vehicle.  Section 845 of the Act extended the 
Other Transaction authority of 10 U.S.C. 2371 to cover prototype projects directly 
relevant to weapons or weapons systems proposed to be acquired or developed.  The 
DoD Other Transaction Guide states that prototype projects can include prototypes of 
weapon subsystems, components, or technology, as well as entire weapon systems.  
Moreover, a prototype can be “a physical or virtual model used to evaluate the technical 
or manufacturing feasibility of military utility of a particular technology or process, 
concept, end item, or system.”  [Ref. 41:p. 12]  
The significance of this Act was that Other Transactions, which were previously 
used as assistance instruments, could now be used as a procurement instrument.  As 
stated above, assistance instruments are used when the principal purpose is to stimulate or 
support research efforts for a public purpose (i.e., not for the direct use or benefit of the  
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department).  Section 845 Other Transaction Authority made this vehicle available for 
procurement, although its use was limited to the prototype stage of weapons 
development. 
These “Section 845” prototype projects were to be conducted under the provisions 
of 10 U.S.C. 2371.  However, unlike Other Transactions for “research” awarded under 
the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 2371, Other Transactions for prototype projects were exempt 
from the cost-sharing requirement.  Further, awards under this authority did not require 
DARPA to determine that the use of a standard contract, grant, or cooperative agreement 
was not appropriate or feasible.  Section 845 was intended as a three-year pilot.   
Section 804 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1997 (PL 104-201) 
extended Section 845 prototype authority to the secretaries of the military departments 
and any other official designated by the Secretary of Defense.   
The statutory authority of 10 U.S.C. 2371 has been extended three times.  The 
National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1999 extended it through 30 September 2001.  
Section 803 of the FY 2001 Defense Authorization Act extended DoD’s Section 845 
prototype authority to September 30, 2004 and established new conditions for the 
appropriate use of the authority.  Specifically:  
The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that no official of an agency enters 
into a transaction (other than a contract, grant, or cooperative agreement) 
for a prototype project under the authority of this section unless-- 
(A)  there is at least one nontraditional defense contractor 
participating to a significant extent in the prototype project; or 
(B)  no nontraditional defense contractor is participating to a 
significant extent in the prototype project, but at least one of the 
following circumstances exists: 
(i)  At least one third of the total cost of the prototype 
project is to be paid out of funds provided by parties to the 
transaction other than the Federal Government. 
(ii)  The senior procurement executive for the agency (as 
designated for the purposes of section 16(3) of the Office of 
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Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 414(3)) 
determines in writing that exceptional circumstances justify 
the use of a transaction that provides for innovative 
business arrangements or structures that would not be 
feasible or appropriate under a contract. [Ref. 41:p. 1]   
Section 803 also required that all Section 845 OT’s for prototype projects 
requiring total government funding in excess of $5,000,000 must include a clause that 
provides the Comptroller General access to the records of any party to the agreement or 
any entity that participates in the performance of the agreement, and that no transaction 
entered into under this authority shall provide for research that duplicates research being 
conducted under existing DOD programs.  Section 803 did not eliminate the requirement 
originally established by Section 845 of P.L. 103-160 that competitive procedures be 
used to the maximum extent practicable when entering into agreements for prototype 
projects.  
Within Section 803, Congress instituted a new requirement that the Department of 
Defense must submit an annual report to Congress on the use of Other Transaction 
Authority and their compliance with Section 803 restrictions cited above.  This reporting 
requirement will be discussed in more detail in Chapter III of this thesis. 
The Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 
107-314), extended the statutory authority of 10 U.S.C. 2371 through 30 September 
2005. 
As pointed out by Gilliland (2001), Other Transaction Authority evolved down 
two distinctly different paths -- assistance and procurement.  The first is an assistance 
instrument granted under the statutory authority of 10 U.S.C. 2371.  These Other 
Transactions are used to carry out basic, applied or advanced research projects.  As 
pointed out earlier, grants and cooperative agreements are also assistance instruments 
used to support research projects.  The second path, known as a Section 845 Prototype 
Other Transaction, is used for the purpose of pursuing prototype projects directly relevant 




In addition to “Other Transactions,” one other research vehicle was developed 
during the late 1990’s.  That vehicle became known as the Technology Investment 
Agreement (TIA).  TIAs evolved from types of cooperative agreements and “other 
transactions” developed by DARPA and the military departments between 1991 and 
1996.  Since initially being given Other Transaction Authority, DARPA developed an 
Other Transaction instrument, which they called a “consortium agreement”.  When the 
military departments were given the Other Transaction Authority, they primarily used a 
type of cooperative agreement.  In both cases, the instruments were used to carry out 
basic, applied or advanced research projects and were tailored to remove barriers (i.e., 
traditional government acquisition statutes and regulations) to attracting commercial 
firms.  By 1997, it was apparent that DARPA and the services were issuing two different 
instruments with different names, but citing the same authority and pursuing the same 
contractors.  It was determined that this was causing a lot of confusion within DoD and 
industry.  Consequently, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) 
which is the office responsible for assistance policy, issued guidance on December 2, 
1997 merging the two types of agreements into a single class of assistance instrument 
called a TIA.  [Ref. 5:p. 13] 
It is important to note that prior research by Stamatopoulas (1999), Gilliland 
(2001), and Tucker (2002), along with multiple DoD websites, unanimously assert that 
the primary purpose of Other Transaction Authority was to eliminate barriers which, in 
the past, had prevented DoD from tapping into private sector R&D, and to gain access to 
industry leaders who traditionally did not do business with the Department of Defense.  
Prior research has touched on the fact that some previously untapped sources of 
commercial R&D did in fact start participating in DoD projects as a result of Other 
Transaction Authority, but not to the extent expected or intended.  [Ref. 4:p. 101 and Ref. 
5:p. 24]  If a significant amount of RDT&E dollars awarded using Other Transaction 
Authority is not going to these “non-traditional” contractors, who is getting those funds?  
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III. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
In order to determine whether Other Transactions have met the intent of 
Congress, one must look at available data.  This thesis will focus on two key data 
sources.  The first is the Department of Defense Annual Report on Cooperative 
Agreements and Other Transactions submitted to Congress for fiscal years 1997 through 
2003 (Key data from those reports were placed in the spreadsheets provided at Appendix 
C.).  The other data source of interest to this researcher is the annual reports for fiscal 
years 1997 through 2003 that list the Top 100 DoD Contractors Receiving Contract 
Awards For Research, Development, Test, And Evaluation (RDT&E).  The Department 
of Defense Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (DIOR) issues these 
reports.  
A. ANNUAL REPORTS ON COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS AND OTHER 
TRANSACTIONS  
10 U.S.C. 2371(h)(1) requires that not later than 90 days after the end of each 
fiscal year, the Secretary of Defense submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the 
Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report 
on the use of cooperative agreements and other transactions. 
Fiscal year 1997 was the first year that the Department of Defense submitted its 
Annual Report on Cooperative Agreements and Other Transactions to Congress.  The 
report included a one page “introduction” that summarized the awards for that fiscal year.  
As with all submissions to Congress in subsequent fiscal years, the rest of the report was 
a series of one - three page summaries of each award.  Appendix B is seven pages taken 
from the DoD “OT Guide, January 2001”, which provides the services with instructions 
on the required format, and what information to include in the annual report.  One of 
these reports was required for each cooperative agreement or other transaction award.   
The information provided in those individual summary pages was dictated by 




The report shall include, with respect to the cooperative agreements and 
other transactions covered by the report, the following: 
(A) The technology areas in which research projects were 
conducted under such agreements or other transactions. 
(B) The extent of the cost-sharing among Federal Government 
and non-Federal sources. 
(C) The extent to which the use of the cooperative agreements 
and other transactions -- 
(i) has contributed to a broadening of the technology 
and industrial base available for meeting 
Department of Defense needs; and 
(ii) has fostered within the technology and industrial 
base new relationships and practices that support 
the national security of the United States. 
The total amount of payments, if any, that were received by the Federal 
Government during the fiscal year covered by the report pursuant to a 
clause described in subsection (d) that was included in the cooperative 
agreements and other transactions, and the amount of such payments, if 
any, that were credited to each account established under subsection (f). 
B. PROCUREMENT STATISTICS 
Each year the Department of Defense Directorate for Information Operations and 
Reports (DIOR) collects data from the DD350 and DD1057 databases.  The DD350, 
Individual Contracting Action Report, is a form generated to provide detailed information 
on each award made by DoD for all awards over the value of $25,000.  The DD1057, 
Monthly Summary of Contracting Actions, provides similar information for awards at or 
below that threshold.   
The DIOR then takes the data collected in the DD350 and DD1057 databases and 
generates statistical reports.  Of interest to this researcher is the report that lists the “Top 
100 DoD Contractors Receiving Contract Awards for Research, Development, Test, And 
Evaluation (RDT&E).”   
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The Top 10 companies, their rank, and the total amount of RDT&E dollars 
awarded to them for fiscal years 1997 through 2003 are provided in the following two 
tables: 
 
Table 1. Ranking of Top 10 Among DoD Contractors Receiving RDT&E Dollars For 
Fiscal Years 1997 - 2003 (From: [Ref. 42]) 
 
Contractor FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 
Lockheed Martin 
Corporation 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
The Boeing Company 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Northrop Grumman 
Corporation  
3 4 3 3 3 3 3 
Raytheon Corporation 4 3 4 4 5 5 5 
General Dynamics 
Corporation   
5 5   9 7 7 
Textron Incorporated 6 7      
TRW Incorporated 7 6 5 5 6 8  
General Motors Corporation 8       
United Technologies 
Corporation  
9  6 8 4 4 8 
Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology 
10 10  10    
The Mitre Corporation  8 7 6 10   
The Carlyle Group  9 8     
The Aerospace Corporation   10  8 10 10 




  9 9  9 9 
Halliburton Company       4 
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Table 2. Total RDT&E Dollars Awarded to Top 10 DoD Contractors For Fiscal Years 
1997 – 2003-for Contractor Dollars (in billions) (From: [Ref. 42])   
 


































Raytheon Corporation $.7 $1.1 $.9 $.6 $.6 $1.0 $1.3 
General Dynamics 
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The Mitre Corporation  $.4 $.4 $.4 $.4   
The Carlyle Group  $.4 $.4     
The Aerospace 
Corporation 
























Halliburton Company       $1.5 
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1  Department of Defense Budget for Fiscal Year 1999, RDT&E Programs (R-1), February 1998 
2  Department of Defense Budget for Fiscal Years 2000/2001, RDT&E Programs (R-1), February 1999 
3  Department of Defense Budget for Fiscal Year 2001, RDT&E Programs (R-1), February 2000 
4  Department of Defense Budget for Fiscal Year 2003, RDT&E Programs (R-1), February 2002 
5  Department of Defense Budget for Fiscal Years 2004/2005, RDT&E Programs (R-1), February 2003 
6  Department of Defense Budget for Fiscal Year 2005, RDT&E Programs (R-1), February 2004 
7   Calculated by author 
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As discussed in previous chapters, the intent of Congress when it passed Section 
251 of Public Law 101-189 (10 U.S.C. 2371) was to provide the Department of Defense 
with a new vehicle that could be used to attract non-traditional contractors to DoD 
science and technology projects.  Previous research has focused on the fact that “non-
traditional” firms have participated in DoD science and technology projects as a result of 
other transaction authority.  Rather than focus on the fact that some new participants were 
attracted to DoD science and technology projects and concluding that the legislation is a 
success, this researcher chose to focus on the number of awards and the total dollar value  
awarded to these new participants as compared with traditional defense contractors in the 
DoD procurement arena who also received awards using the authorities of 10 U.S.C. 
2358 (cooperative agreements) and 10 U.S.C. 2371 (other transactions).   
C. “MAJOR PLAYER” VS. “NON-TRADITIONAL CONTRACTOR” 
The DIOR data was utilized to identify the major players within the world of 
defense procurement.  For purposes of this thesis, the term “major player” refers to a 
company which is ranked in the Top 10 among DoD contractors receiving RDT&E 
dollars in any given year.  
The contractors identified (above) in Ranking of Top 10 Among DoD Contractors 
Receiving RDT&E Dollars For Fiscal Years 1997 - 2003 are the major players in defense 
research and development for the period FY97-03.  The fact that many of these 
companies are in the Top 10 year after year, serves to reinforce that they are major 
players.  Additional evidence can be found in the sheer volume of DoD RDT&E dollars 
flowing to these contractors, as illustrated by Total RDT&E Dollars Awarded to Top 10 
DoD Contractors For Fiscal Years 1997 – 2003 (above).   
Although the term “major player” was established for purposes of this thesis, the 
term “non-tradition contractor” has an official definition.  According to Section 845, 
paragraph (e), a non-traditional contractor is:  
An entity that has not, for a period of at least one year prior to the date that 
a transaction (other than a contract, grant, or cooperative agreement) for a 
prototype project under the authority of this section is entered into, entered 
into or performed with respect to 
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(1) any contract that is subject to full coverage under the cost accounting 
standards prescribed pursuant to section 26 of the Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 422) and the regulations implementing 
such section; or 
(2) any other contract in excess of $500,000 to carry out prototype projects 
or to perform basic, applied, or advanced research projects for a Federal 
agency, that is subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation. 
The dollars awarded to “major players” vs. “non-traditional” contractors in any 
given year serve to illustrate the stark contrast between these two groups.  For example, 
let’s look at fiscal year 2003.  The Top 10 contractors for 2003 are shown in the chart 
below with the amount of RDT&E dollars (in millions) awarded to them during that year.  
The column on the right is the percentage of total DoD RDT&E dollars awarded 
(contracts, grants, cooperative agreements, and “other transactions”) to that particular 
contractor during fiscal year 2003.  The Department of Defense Budget for Fiscal Year 
2005, RDT&E Programs (R-1), February 2004, states that the total RDT&E budget for 
fiscal year 2003 was $58,307,309,000. 
  
Table 3. Total RDT&E Dollars (in millions) Awarded to Top 10 DoD Contractors For 
Fiscal Year 2003 (From: [Ref. 42])  
 
Lockheed Martin Corporation $7,400 12.7%
The Boeing Company  $4,257 7.3%
Northrop Grumman Corporation $2,833 4.9%
Halliburton Company $1,542 2.6%
Raytheon Corporation  $1,269 2.2%
Boeing/Sikorsky Team $   774 1.3%
General Dynamics Corporation   $   721 1.2%
United Technologies Corporation $   714 1.2%
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) $   541 .9%
The Aerospace Corporation $   539 .9%
TOTALS1 $20,590 35.2%
1 Calculated by author 
 
 
By comparison, the Department of Defense Annual Report on Cooperative 
Agreements and Other Transactions submitted to Congress for fiscal year 2003 shows 
that the largest award made to a non-traditional prime contractor using cooperative 
 43 
agreements and other transactions during fiscal year 2003 was $75M (.13 per percent of 
the total DoD RDT&E budget for Fiscal Year 2003).  That award went to Frontier 
Systems Incorporated and covered a four-year period of performance.  This is an 
unusually large award as the next highest award to a non-traditional contractor during 
that fiscal year was to The Space Launch Corporation in the amount of $20.8M (.04 per 
percent of the total DoD RDT&E budget for Fiscal Year 2003). 
There is a clear difference between the amounts of funding going to any one of 
the “major players” compared to the top two “non-traditional” contractors in fiscal year 
2003. 
D. ANALYSIS OF THE ANNUAL REPORTS ON COOPERATIVE 
AGREEMENTS AND OTHER TRANSACTIONS  
The annual reports to Congress identify (if applicable) awards that were made to 
“non-traditional” contractors.  Most reports also identify (if applicable) when 
subcontracts are awarded to “non-traditional” contractors.  There are a few cases when a 
report states that subcontracts were awarded to “non-traditional” contractors, but do not 
identify the recipients of those subcontracts.  In those cases, this researcher took the 
report at face value and gave credit for a subcontract to a “non-traditional” contractor.  It 
should be stated that in all cases, the researcher assumed that the reports were accurate in 
their reporting of traditional defense contractor participation as well as “non-traditional” 
contractor participation.   
The matrix below illustrates the number of awards (cooperative agreements and 
“other transactions”) and the total amount of DoD RDT&E funds in those categories over 
the period FY97 through FY03.  The data was developed by this researcher using the 








Table 4. Total Dollars (in millions) and Number of Awards of Cooperative Agreements 
and “Other Transactions” Citing “Non-Traditional” Participation, as Reported to 
Congress for Fiscal Years 1997 - 2003  
 
















































































































































































(Awards) 0 1 0 1 2 0 1 5 
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(Awards) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Other $0.0 $5.5 $1.0 $0.0 $3.4 $19.3 $0.3 29.5 
(Awards) 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 5 
TOTAL 








The data presented in the chart above supports the assertions made in previous 
research that the authorities of 10 U.S.C. 2358 (cooperative agreements) and 10 U.S.C. 
2371 (other transactions) have made it possible for DoD to attract non-traditional 
contractors to DoD research efforts.  However, the data presented in the chart below 
makes it clear that the lion’s share of awards and DoD RDT&E dollars awarded in the 
form of cooperative agreements and “other transactions” are being used to fund research 











Table 5. Total Dollars (in millions) and Number of Awards of Cooperative Agreements 
and “Other Transactions” as Reported to Congress for Fiscal Years 1997 – 
2003, No “Non-Traditional” Participation Reported 
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(Awards) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 










































































It should be noted that the reports citing non-traditional subcontractors or non-
traditional team members do not identify how much of the award value flows to those 
subcontractors/team members.  
In order to get a flavor for the significant difference between “major player” and 
“non-traditional” prime contractor, the researcher presented data from fiscal year 2003 
(pages 42 and 43).  Using the data available in Appendix C, we can look at all fiscal years 







Table 6. Total Dollars (in millions) and Number of Awards of Cooperative Agreements 
and “Other Transactions” as Reported to Congress for Fiscal Years 1997 – 
2003, “Non-Traditional” Prime Contractor and “Major Player” 
 














































































(Awards) 10 37 34 41 14 11 6 153 
 
The data in Table 6 above was extracted directly from Table 4 and Table 5.  This 
data shows that during the seven-year period from FY97 – FY03, $396.6M in DoD 
RDT&E dollars were awarded through the use of cooperative agreements and “other 
transactions” directly to “non-traditional” prime contractors.  This represents only 6.9 
percent of the total $5,707.4M awarded through the use of cooperative agreements and 
“other transactions” during that period.  The amount of $5,707.4 was arrived at by adding 
the totals from the Table 4 ($1,775.2) and Table 5 ($3,932.2).   
A much larger number of dollars went to “major players” with no “non-
traditional” contractor participation.  The data above shows that during this period, 
$2,178.7M (38.2 percent) of total RDT&E dollars awarded through the use of 
cooperative agreements and “other transactions” went directly to the “major players” 
with no “non-traditional” contractor participation.   
In addition to the difference in total DoD RDT&E dollars awarded to these two 
groups, there is also a major difference between the number of awards and the average 
amount of the awards.  Eighty-seven (87) awards were made to “non-traditional” prime 
contractors.  One hundred, fifty-three (153) awards were made to “major players” with no 
“non-traditional” contractor participation.  Dividing the total number of awards for each 
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group into the total dollars awarded we find that the average dollar amount of an award to 
a “non-traditional” prime contractor was $4.6M, whereas, the average dollar amount of 
an award to a “major player” with no “non-traditional” contractor participation was more 
than three times as great at $14.2M. 
The analysis above was limited to a comparison between one segment of Table 4 
(“Non-Traditional” Prime Contractor) and one segment of Table 5 (“Major Player”, No 
“Non-Traditional” Participation).  We can also compare Tables 4 and 5 in their entirety.  
The data in those charts illustrate the fact that the number of dollars flowing to any 
cooperative agreement or “other transaction” with even a small amount of participation 
by a “non-traditional” contractor pales in comparison to the number of awards and 
amount of funds flowing to traditional defense contractors.  During the seven-year period 
from fiscal year 1997 through fiscal year 2003, only 202 cooperative agreements and 
“other transactions” were awarded with some degree of “non-traditional” contractor 
participation, while 580 cooperative agreements and “other transactions” were awarded 
to traditional defense contractors with no “non-traditional” contractor participation. 
The data in Table 4 shows that during that seven year period, $1,775.2M in DoD 
RDT&E dollars were awarded through the use of cooperative agreements and “other 
transactions” which cite the participation of a  “non-traditional” prime contractor, or (to 
some degree) “non-traditional” subcontractor(s) or team member(s).  This represents 31.1 
percent of the total $5,707.4M awarded through the use of cooperative agreements and 
“other transactions” during that period.   
The data in Table 5, shows that during that seven year period, $3,932.2M in DoD 
RDT&E dollars were awarded through the use of cooperative agreements and “other 
transactions” which indicate that there is no participation of “non-traditional” contractors 
in these awards.  This represents 68.9 percent of the total $5,707.4M awarded through the 
use of cooperative agreements and “other transactions” during that period.   
Only 31.1 percent of total DoD RDT&E dollars awarded through the use of 
cooperative agreements and “other transactions” went directly (or indirectly) to “non-
traditional” contractors.  Conversely, during that same seven-year period, 68.9 percent of 
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total RDT&E dollars awarded using cooperative agreements and “other transactions” 
went to traditional defense contractors with no “non-traditional” contractor participation.   
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented and analyzed all the Department of Defense Annual 
Reports on Cooperative Agreements and Other Transactions submitted to Congress for 
fiscal years 1997 through 2003.  The data from these reports were reviewed to determine 
if “non-traditional” contractors have been attracted to DoD science and technology 
projects as a result of the authorities of 10 U.S.C. 2358 (cooperative agreements) and 10 
U.S.C. 2371 (other transactions).  The answer to that question is clearly “yes”. 
However, the primary purpose of this chapter was to determine if cooperative 
agreements and “other transactions” have been awarded to traditional defense 
contractors, and if so, to what extent.  The data presented above clearly illustrates that 
traditional defense contractors have received awards under the authorities of 10 U.S.C. 
2358 and 10 U.S.C. 2371.  The data also clearly illustrates that despite the intent of the 
legislation and the will of Congress to use these authorities to attract “non-traditional” 
contractors to DoD science and technology projects, a large majority of these awards 
have gone to traditional defense contractors who proposed no “non-traditional” contractor 
participation. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS   
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study was to provide a comprehensive analysis of Department 
of Defense “other transaction” awards in order to determine the extent to which these 
awards have achieved the objectives of the legislation that made them possible.  This 
final chapter will provide the researcher’s principal conclusions.  These conclusions were 
derived from data accumulated and analyzed from all reports submitted to Congress by 
the Department of Defense detailing cooperative agreement and other transaction awards 
for fiscal years 1997 through 2003.  Chapter IV will also present recommendations based 
on the principle conclusions, provide answers to research questions presented in Chapter 
I, and suggest opportunities for further research expanding on this, and previous research 
in the area of “other transactions.” 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The data presented and analyzed in Chapter III lead this researcher to the 
following conclusions: 
• The Department of Defense has been minimally successful at attracting 
“non-traditional” contractors to defense R&D projects. 
As stated by Gilliland (2001), “DOD’s most frequently stated primary expected 
benefit of using Section 845 OTA is to give it access to more non-traditional R&D 
resources.”  Congress indicated this in the language of the legislation authorizing OTA.  
The DUSD (AT&L) stated it in its most current OT regulatory document.  Finally, GAO 
referred to it in a 2000 report as DOD’s most often cited expected benefit.” 
As detailed in this thesis, only a very small number of cooperative agreements and 
“other transactions” have been awarded directly to “non-traditional” contractors for 
Department of Defense research and development efforts.  The number of awards and the 
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1.  Sum of Award Totals from Tables 4 and 5 (pages 45 and 47) 
2.  Totals from Table 4 (page 44) 
 
If the purpose of the Other Transaction Authority was to attract “non-traditional” 
contractors to DoD research projects, and over the seven (7) year period only 11.1 
percent of the awards went to these contractors, then this researcher concludes that (in 
large part) this “other transaction” approach to reaching these contractors was ineffective. 
• The amount of RDT&E funding flowing to these “non-traditional” 
contractors is minuscule. 
Chapter III documented the fact that “non-traditional” contractors tended to 
receive only a very small portion of the funding awarded through the use of cooperative 
agreements and “other transactions.”  The details are presented in the chart below. 
 
Dollars in Millions 































$10.1 $58.5 $10.8 $24.1 $120.9 $20.1 $152.1 $396.6 
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Percentage .028% .157% .028% .063% .290% .041% .261% .133% 
1.  Data Obtained from R-1 Reports as Presented in Table 2 (page 40) 
2.  Totals from Table 4 (page 44) 
 
As discussed in Chapter II, the Department of Defense and Congress came to 
realize in the 1980’s that most of the innovation was taking place (and being funded) by 
companies that primarily served the needs of the commercial marketplace.  DoD 
recognized that it was in the best interest of the Department to integrate the government 
and commercial sectors of the national technology and industrial base.  Specifically, 
technology and industrial base integration would help reduce the Department of 
Defense’s life-cycle costs for weapon and support systems.  It would also help increase 
technological sophistication by allowing the Department of Defense to take advantage of 
technology in the commercial marketplace that often is more advanced than what is 
available in the defense sector. 
One would expect from the arguments made by DoD that once they received 
some relief from the laws and regulations associated with FAR-type procurements, the 
flood gates would be opened and DoD would be making large investments in 
commercially available technologies.  That obviously was not the case.  There is a huge 
disparity between the arguments made by DoD in the 1980’s in order to get 
Congressional authorization for a procurement vehicle like “other transactions,” and the 
actual use of that vehicle once authorization was given.  It is very apparent from the table 
above that DoD has made minimal use of OTA as a means of integrating defense and 
commercial technology and industrial bases. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
• Revise the DoD “OT Guide” to require the services to report the amount 
of funding expected to flow to “non-traditional” contractors. 
As illustrated in Table 4, during fiscal years 1997 through 2003, there were one 
hundred and ten (110) awards to traditional defense contractors with one or more “non-
traditional” subcontractors or team members.  The problem is that little detail about these 
 54 
awards is provided in the reports to Congress.  Some reports identify the “non-
traditional” players while others do not.  None of the reports citing “non-traditional” 
subcontractors or “non-traditional” team members indicate how much of the award value 
flows to those subcontractors or team members.   
If DoD and Congress are to fully determine the effectiveness of Other Transaction 
Authority, it is essential for these policy-making bodies to know how much of DoD’s 
RDT&E funding is going to these “non-traditional” contractors. 
• It is time for Congress and the Department of Defense to evaluate and 
quantify the benefits of the Other Transaction Authority.  
The Department of Defense is now in its ninth year of using Other Transaction 
Authority.  It is time to determine if the Department is realizing the promised benefits of 
using “other transactions.” 
Here are some of the questions to be answered regarding OTA: 
• Have contractors actually contributed the cost-share on which some 
awards were based?  
• Did “non-traditional” contractors benefit from their relationship with DoD 
and if so, how? 
• Why have so many commercial firms participated in only one award? 
• What benefits have been realized by DoD in using “other transactions” 
with traditional defense contractors? 
• Many of the reports cited “dual-use” as the rationale for using an “other 
transaction.”  How many new or improved products have entered the 
commercial market place as a result of the DoD funded research?  
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
• Have Other Transactions (OTs) met the intent of Congress? 
Research at the Naval Postgraduate School performed prior to this thesis touched 
on the fact that some previously untapped sources of commercial R&D did in fact begin 
to participate in DoD projects as a result of Other Transaction Authority, but not to the 
extent expected or intended.  [Ref. 4: p. 101 and Ref. 5: p. 21]   
The data presented in Chapter III of this thesis clearly illustrated that “non-
traditional” defense contractors have received awards under the authorities of 10 U.S.C. 
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2358 and 10 U.S.C. 2371.  The data also clearly illustrates that despite the intent of the 
legislation and the will of Congress to use these authorities to attract “non-traditional” 
contractors to DoD science and technology projects, a large majority of these awards 
have been awarded to traditional defense contractors who proposed no “non-traditional” 
contractor participation. 
• What is Congressional intent with respect to Other Transactions? 
Prior research by Stamatopoulas (1999), Gilliland (2001), and Tucker (2002), 
along with multiple DoD websites, unanimously assert that the primary purpose of Other 
Transaction Authority was to eliminate barriers which, in the past, had prevented DoD 
from tapping into private sector R&D and gaining access to industry leaders who 
traditionally did not do business with the Department of Defense.   
• What percentage of Department of Defense RDT&E dollars are awarded 
through the use of Cooperative Agreements or Other Transactions? 
The answer to this question, using data covering fiscal years 1997 through 2003, 
is presented in the chart below. 
 
Dollars in Billions 






































































Percentage .97% 1.73% 4.29% 2.80% 1.09% 2.11% .89% 1.91% 
1.  Data Obtained from R-1 Reports as Presented in Table 2 (page 40) 






• To what extent are traditional defense contractors the recipients of OTs? 
Chapter III clearly illustrated that a large portion of cooperative agreements and 
“other transactions” were awarded to traditional defense contractors.  The answer to this 
question, for fiscal years 1997 through 2003, is presented in the chart below. 
 




















































































































1.  Sum of Award Totals from Tables 4 and 5 (pages 45 and 47) 
2.  Totals from Table 4 (page 44) 
 
E. SUGGESTED AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The intent of Congress when it passed Section 251 of Public Law 101-189 (10 
U.S.C. 2371) was to provide the Department of Defense with a new vehicle that could be 
used to attract non-traditional contractors to DoD science and technology projects.  
Previous research at the Naval Postgraduate School concluded that “non-traditional” 
firms have participated in DoD science and technology projects as a result of other 




Previous researchers have also concluded that only a small portion of these “other 
transactions” were awarded to “non-traditional” contractors.  Again, this thesis confirms 
and quantifies those findings. 
This thesis served to answer several questions about the impact Other Transaction 
Authority had on the Department of Defense’s ability to attract “non-traditional” 
contractors.  This thesis also identified areas requiring further research. 
• To what extend did “non-traditional” contractors benefit when the awards 
were made to traditional defense contractors? 
In Table 4 there are several categories listed where a traditional defense contractor 
received the prime award, but the report to Congress stated that a “non-traditional” 
contractor was a subcontractor or a team member.  None of these reports quantified the 
amount of the award that flowed to the “non-traditional” contractor.  Obtaining copies of 
all the proposals that were the basis for these awards, and quantifying the dollars flowing 
to the “non-traditional” contractors, would complete the analysis started by this thesis. 
• From fiscal years 1998 through 2000, a significant portion of Cooperative 
Agreements and Other Transactions was awarded to “Major Players” with 
no “non-traditional” contractor participation.  Significantly, fewer awards 
went to “Non-Traditional” Prime Contractors.  Starting in fiscal year 2001, 
the opposite was true. 
Table 6 (reproduced below) illustrates this trend. 
 



































































(Awards) 10 37 34 41 14 11 6 153 
 
The average number of awards to a “Major Player” for fiscal years 1998, 1999, and 2000 
was 37.  The average number of awards to a “Major Player” for the next three fiscal years 
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dropped to 10.  The average number of awards to a “Non-Traditional” Prime Contractor 
for Fiscal Years 1998, 1999, and 2000 was only eight.  The average number of awards to 
a “Non-Traditional” Prime Contractor for the next three Fiscal Years jumped to 17.   
• How many non-traditional contractors accepted cooperative agreements or 
“other transactions” more than once? 
The true test of a successful product or service is the number of customers, 
particularly “repeat customers”.  As shown in Table 4, there were eighty-seven (87) 
prime awards to “non-traditional” contractors in fiscal years 1997 through 2003.  The 
spreadsheet at Appendix C details those eighty-seven (87) prime awards.  You will note 
that of the eighty-seven (87) awards, fifty-eighty (58) were made to contractors who 
never received another cooperative agreement or “other transaction” award during fiscal 
years 1997 through 2003.  There may be three explanations for this.  First, the research 
was concluded at the end of the performance period for the award.  Second, the 
Government chose not to continue funding that research a second time.  Third, the 
contractor would not accept another Government award.  
Another category of prime awards to “non-traditional” contractors in fiscal years 
1997 through 2003 is contractors who received two awards, yet would not be considered 
by this researcher to have received multiple awards.  One example is 3COM Corporation.  
3COM Corporation received two awards in 1997; however, those awards were made only 
one month apart.  It is not likely that this contractor had time to evaluate the full “other 
transaction” experience before it accepted the second award.  The reader will note that 
3COM Corporation was not awarded (or did not accept) another “other transaction” 
award.   
Another example is Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation.  Although this firm 
received awards in fiscal years 2001 and 2002, the award in 2002 was merely an 
expansion to the 2001 effort.  In essence, this contractor was only awarded one “other 
transaction” during the time period 1997 through 2003. 
It is difficult to draw the same conclusion with regard to Frontier Systems, Inc 
since both awards were made in fiscal year 2003 (less than one month apart), and this 
thesis does not cover fiscal year 2004. 
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Additional research should delve into two areas.  First, did contractors receiving 
their first awards in fiscal year 2003 accept any awards in subsequent fiscal years?  
Second, future research should involve surveying or interviewing the contractors who 
were not offered, or did not accept, any other awards beyond the one they were awarded 
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APPENDIX B. ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 
 
 
Explanation of the Format for submission of data 
 
Format Part I - Individual Inputs for Report to Congress 
 
Format Part II - Summary of Prior Year Agreements with Funds Recouped During the Current Fiscal Year 
 
Guidelines to Assist in Answering Part I Questions 
 




Part I:  Title 10, U.S.C. 2371(h) requires a report be submitted to Congress each year by December 31st for 
awards made in the preceding fiscal year, pursuant to this authority.  This includes, for prototype projects 
that use this authority, all initial awards, new prototype projects added to existing agreements, and options 
exercised or new phases awarded. Individual agreement summaries should not exceed 2 pages.  Formatted 
examples are available electronically at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dp (under Defense Systems 
Procurement Strategies) and have all the settings properly implemented.  Follow those examples for 
guidance on submission. Format settings are described below for clarification.  Each agency should 
compile all Part I individual reports on prototype projects into one word document, with page breaks 
separating each prototype project. 
 
Page settings: 
Use Portrait page orientation.   Right, Left, Top and Bottom margins are set to 1.0 inch, Header and Footer 
are set to .5 inch from edge.  Times New Roman 10 pitch for all text. 
 
Header and Footer:  Content is preset and may be modified by OSD – Do not change these. 
 
Body of each report:  Part I will be the individual report submissions.  For this part: 
Headings will be preceded by a blank line, terminate with a colon and be in bold.  Apply Title Case (each 
key word starts with a capital) to data text of the following headings: Type of Transaction, Title, Awarding 
Office, and Awardee.  Text data for all other heading will be in sentence case.  Put two spaces between the 
heading colon and the data that is entered.  The data entry for each heading is not to be bolded or italicized.  
Be sure to delete the italicized instruction/informational content provided within the sample.   
 
Data for the following headings should be on the same line as the heading:  Agreement Number, Type of 
Agreement, Title, Awarding Office, Awardee  (do not include the awardee’s address or locale unless 
needed for differentiation, i.e. University of California, Irvine), Effective Date, Estimated Completion or 
Expiration Date, U.S. Government Dollars, Non-Government Dollars, Dollars returned to Government 
Account.  If additional lines are needed, indent the subsequent line(s) of text to meet the beginning point 
for prior line of data entry.  Dollar fields should be in whole dollars without cents (not in $K) and every 
heading should have an entry – even if it’s $ 0.  Put one space between the $ and the first numeral. 
 
Data entry for the following fields will be on the line immediately after the heading and will not be 
indented: Technical Objectives …, both Extent to which … questions, and the Other Benefits … question. 
 
Part II:  Any Prototype Other Transactions that were reported in previous year Congressional reports that 
recouped funds during this reporting year are to be listed in a separate table.  Provide the Agreement 
Number, Year the agreement was entered into and the amount of the recoupment.  Each agency should 




PART I SAMPLE REPORT FORMAT (Delete this title in your submission, as well as all italicized 
instructions below.) 
 
Agreement Number:   XXXXX-XX-X-XXXX (The ninth position of all prototype OTs will be coded 
“9”.) 
 
Type of Agreement:  Other Transaction for Prototype  
 
Title:  Next Generation Electrical Architecture  (provide a short title describing the research or prototype 
project) 
 
Awarding Office:  US Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM), AMSTA-CM-
CLGC (identify the military department or defense agency and the buying office) 
 
Awardee:  Boom Electronics, Inc.   (entry is in Title Case do not use address) 
 
Effective Date:  29 Sep 1999  (entry is ## Aaa ####) 
 
Estimated Completion or Expiration Date:  30 Sep 2001 
 
U. S. Government Dollars:  $ 2,285,000  (entry is $ ###,###  - If zero use $ 0 - identify the total dollar 
value of expected government contributions to the agreement) 
 
Non-Government Dollars:  $ 2,665,000 (identify the total dollar value of expected non-government 
contributions to the agreement - if the reason authority is used is cost-sharing, then this amount must 
represent one third of the total dollars) 
 
Dollars Returned to Government Account:  $ 0 (identify the amount of any payments made to the federal 
government in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 2371(d)) 
 
Technical objectives of this effort including the technology areas in which the project was conducted: 
The technical objectives of this effort… (describe the technical objectives and the technology areas being proven by the agreement).   
 
Extent to which the cooperative agreement or other transaction has contributed to a broadening of 
the technology and industrial base available for meeting Department of Defense needs:   
The use of an other transaction agreement has … (Discuss how the use of an other transaction agreement 
has contributed to a broadening of the technology and industrial base available for meeting DoD needs. 
The Guidelines in this Appendix can assist you in responding to this question.  If the reason OTA is used is 
because non-traditional defense contractors are participating to a significant extent, then the answer to this 
question should identify who these non-traditional defense contractors are, what significant contribution 
they are making, and address how the use of OTA facilitated their participation.) 
  
Extent to which the cooperative agreement or other transaction has fostered within the technology 
and industrial base new relationships and practices that support the national security of the USA:   
The use of an other transaction agreement has … (Discuss how the use of an other transaction agreement 
has fostered new business relationships or practices that support the national security of the United States. 
Again, the Guidelines in this Appendix can assist you in responding to this question.  If the reason OTA is 
used is based on cost-sharing or exceptional circumstances then the details then that reason should be 
explicitly stated in answering this question, and explained fully as discussed in the Guidelines to this 
Appendix.)  
 
Other benefits to the DOD through use of this agreement:   
The use of an other transaction has resulted in additional benefits, not addressed above… (This is an 
optional field that can be completed if there are other benefits that warrant reporting beyond those 
addressed above.  If there are no other benefits to be reported, then delete this header in your report 
submission.)  
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PART II SAMPLE REPORT FORMAT (Delete this title in your submission, as well as all examples 
shown in the table below.) 
 
 
Funds recouped during FY XXXX (Fill in the appropriate fiscal year) 
 





MDA972-95-9-0051 1995 $8,675 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 Total: $28,675 
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GUIDELINES TO ASSIST IN ANSWERING PART I QUESTIONS  
Extent the other transaction has contributed to a broadening of the technology and industrial base 
available for meeting DoD needs:  (Focus on how use of an other transaction makes a difference.  
Consider:) 
• Did the use of the OT result in nontraditional defense contractors participating to a significant extent in 
the prototype project that would not otherwise have participated in the project? If so: 
• Identify the nontraditional defense contractors and explain why they would not typically 
participate if a procurement contract was used?  For example, are they business units that 
normally accept no business with the government, that do business only through OTs or contracts 
for commercial items, or that limit their volume of Federal contracts to avoid a threshold at which 
they would have to comply with cost accounting standards or some other government 
requirement? 
• Were there provisions of the OT or features of the award process that enabled their participation?  
If so, explain specifically what they were. 
• What are the significant contributions expected as a result of the nontraditional defense contractor’s 
participation (e.g.,  supplying new key technology or products, accomplishing a significant amount of 
the effort, or in some other way causing a material reduction in the cost or schedule or increase in 
performance.  Please be specific and explain how this contributes to a broadening of the technology 
and industrial base available to DoD?  
 • Did the Department gain access to technology areas or commercial products that would not be possible 
under a procurement contract?  If so, identify these areas and explain how the use of the OT facilitated 
the access.   
• Are there any other benefits of the use of the OT that you perceive helped the Department broaden the 
technology or industrial base available to DoD?  If so, wha t were they, how do they help meet defense 
objectives, what features of the OT or award process enable us to realize them and why could they not 
have been realized using a procurement contract?  Please be specific. 
 
Extent the other transaction has fostered within the technology and industrial base new relationships 
and practices that support the national security of the United States:  (Focus on what is different 
because we are able to use an other transaction.  Consider:) 
• Was OTA used in a circumstance where at least one third of the total funds of the prototype project are 
provided by the non-federal parties to the agreement? If so, state that this was the reason the authority 
was used and identify the percentage of funds being provided by non-federal parties to the agreement. 
• Was use of OTA based on an SPE determination that exceptional circumstances justify the use of an 
OT that provides for innovative business arrangements or structures that would not be feasible or 
appropriate under a procurement contract?  If so, state this is the reason the authority was used and 
fully describe the innovative business arrangements or structures, the associated benefits, and explain 
why they would not be feasible or appropriate under a procurement contract.   
• Did the use of the OT result in the establishment of new relationships between the government and 
industry or among for-profit business units, among business units of the same firm, or between 
business units and nonprofit performers that will help us get better technology in the future?  If so: 
• Explain the nature of the new relationships. 
• Explain why it is believed that these new relationships will help us get better technology in the 
future. 
• Were there provisions of the OT or features of the award process that enabled the creation of the 
new relationships? If so, explain specifically what they were and why these relationships could 
not have been created using a procurement contract. 
• Did the use of the OT permit traditional government contractors to use new business practices in the 
execution of the prototype project that will help DoD get better technology, get new technology more 
quickly, or get it less expensively?  If so: 
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• Who are those contractors and what are the new business practices? 
• What are the specific benefits expected from the use of these new practices? 
• Were there provisions of the OT or features of the award process that enabled the use of these new 
practices?  If so, specifically what are they and why these practices could not have been used if 
the award had been made using a procurement contract? 
 
Other benefits to the DoD of the use of this agreement:  (Are there any other benefits associated with the 
use of an OT beyond those addressed in the previous questions?  If so:) 
• What are those benefits?  How will they help meet defense objectives? 
• Where there provisions of the OT or features of the award process that attributed to these benefits?  If 
so, specifically what are they and why these benefits could not be achieved with a procurement 
contract? 
• Can the benefits directly attributed to the use of the OTA be quantified? 
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PART III SAMPLE FORMAT 
 
 
Agreement Number:   XXXXX-XX-X-XXXX (The ninth position of all prototype OTs will be coded 
“9”.) 
 
Title:  Next Generation Electrical Architecture  (provide a short title describing the research or prototype 
project) 
 
Awarding Office:  US Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM), AMSTA-CM-
CLGC (identify the military department or defense agency and the buying office) 
 
Agreements Officer:  John Doe (provide the name of the Agreements Officer) 
 
Phone Number:  xxx-xxx-xxxx (provide the commercial phone number for  the Agreements Officer) 
 
Business units that are not currently performing on procurement contracts subject to the Cost 
Principles (48 CFR Part 31) or Cost Accounting Standards (48 CFR Part 99) and will not accept an 
agreement that provides for government access to its records.  (See OT Guide, section C2.14.3.3.  
Include the following information on each business unit that  has been permitted to use an Independent 
Public Accountant for any needed audits.) 
 
Business Unit Name:  ABC Company    
 
Business Unit Address:   2000 Commercial Plaza 
Houston, TX XXXXX 
 
Estimated Amount of this business units efforts:  $  
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